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LEVELING THE PEAKS AND TROUGHS IN THE 
DEMOGRAPHIC CYCLE: AN APPLICATION 
TO SCHOOL ENROLLMENT RATES 
Michael L. Wachter and William L. Wascher* 
Abslrau - To max.i mize lifetime discounted earnings , ind ividu -
als ac t so as to t1ll in the peaks and troughs of the demograph.ic 
cycles exhibited by popula tion and hence relative income. As a 
consequence. those born prior to the peak mcrease thCJr school 
enrollment rates. while th ose tra.J.!ing the peak decrease their 
school enrollment rates. Education thus provides a differential 
track.ino mechan.i sm. While individuals cannot choose the 
cohorts
0
in which they are born, they are able to time their entry 
into the career labor market through education. Th.is asymmet-
ric demoo raph.ic effec t is tested in a time series equation. Our 
model h~lps to expla.in the " surprisi ngly" steep decline In 
school enrollment rates during the 1970s. 
I. Introduction 
ECONOMIC-DEMOGRAPHIC interrelation-ships have received considerable attention over 
the past decade. Of particular interest has been the 
effect of cohort size on labor market variables such 
as relative income, labor force participation, un-
employment, and fertility. Richard A. Easterlin's 
(1968) seminal study analyzed the potential of a 
long-run economic cycle generated by shifts in the 
fertility rate. The key independent variable in his 
analysis was a measure of cohort size. Large cohorts 
suffered a depression in their relative wages and, 
hence, begot small cohorts. The higher relative 
income of the smaller cohorts was hypothesized to 
lead to a renewed upswing in fertility. 
Studies on labor force participation rates 
(Wachter, 1972, 1976) indicated that large cohorts 
had higher labor force participation rates. Equi-
librium unemployment rates were also shown to 
increase as large cohorts entered the labor market 
(Perry, 1971; Wachter, 1976; and Ehrenberg, 1980)_ 
The impact of cohort size on relative income was 
explored, for example, by Freeman (1979), Welch 
(1979), and Berger (1981). 
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The effect of cohort size on school enrollment 
rates has received less attention than the demo-
graphic impact on unemployment and relative 
wages. Richard Freeman's important study, The 
Overeducated American, touched upon the in-
fluence of cohort size, but his focus was on the 
declining rate of return to education.1 In a review 
article, Smith and Welch (1978) emphasized the 
cohort theme and argued that this factor caused 
the decline in the rate of return to education. 
Mattila (1982) examined the effects of rates of 
return to education on school enrollment rates and 
mentioned that cohort size might be a cause of the 
changes in the rate of return. The notion that 
school enrollment rates have responded positively 
to cohort overcrowding received empirical support 
from Wachter and Kim (1982). That study found 
that cohort overcrowding led to a flow of individu-
als out of employment into unemployment, school, 
and out of the labor force. 2 
In this study we argue that the effects of cohort 
overcrowding may be more complicated in that 
important asymmetric effects may be the domi-
nant characteristics. Specifically, for some phe-
nomena the size of the cohort may be less im-
portant to individual decisions than the position of 
individuals relative to the peaks and troughs of the 
demographic cycle. This model is tested on school 
enrollment rate fluctuations. The basic hypothesis, 
as applied to this time series, is that individuals 
born at the beginning of the baby boom are likely 
to have the highest enrollment rates while those 
born at the end are likely to have the lowest rates 
-even though both groups were born into cohorts 
of equal size (relative to the overall population). 
The rationale for the hypothesis, which we refer to 
as the differential tracking model, is that the maxi-
mization of discounted lifetime earnings pushes 
individuals to distance themselves as much as pos-
sible from the peak fertility year cohorts. 
1 See also Free man (1975 . 1977). 
2 Ahlburg. Crimmins, and Easterlin (1981), on the other hand , 
found the opposite result. 
The international data on school enrollment rates have bee n 
an alyzed by Reubens. Harrisson, and Rupp (l 9R1 ). 
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The model is explained in section II. The em-
pirical results , based on enrollment rate data for 
the U nited States, are presented in sect ion III. 
Section IV draws the conclusions and implications 
of the model for economic policy. 
II. The Differential Tracking Model 
Consider a model where all individual s go 
through two stages-one where they combine 
schooling and work and the other where they only 
work. Individuals hold two jobs over their work-
life : a career job an d an entry or youth job. The 
crucial demographic effect that individuals must 
deal with is that the career job wage varies in-
versely with cohort size. 3 
Born into a specific cohort, individuals face 
either favorab le or unfavorable prospects. They 
Can however alter their initial fate or cohort size 
' ' 
in order to improve their prospects. In our stylized 
model , individuals can be viewed essentially as 
shifting their career cohort by adjusting school 
enrollment ra tes so as to maximize discounted 
lifetime earnings. 
The key to maximizing lifetime income is to be 
in the smallest size career cohort possible and thus 
have the highest career wage possible. If a small 
cohort is ahead, individuals take the fast track by 
attending school more intensively. This enables 
them to move ahead so as to be a member of and 
to compete with that smaller cohort. Trailed b y a 
small cohort, individuals take the slow track, ex-
tending their noncareer entry jobs and absorbing 
their education at a leisurely pace. This tracking 
system is illustrated in figure 1. The fast track is 
depicted by curve FF 1 and the slow track by SS 1. 
Note that the slow track is slow only with respect 
to the delay in starting the career job. 4 
After individuals devote a minimum amount of 
time to stage one, they choose how much of their 
remaining worklife to devote to each stage. Indi-
viduals taking the normal track (case A) spend T1 
in the first period and obtain an average amount 
3 To a lesser extent this is also true of the youth wage , bu t in 
our formal development of the model, we assumed that the 
youth wage was constant to facilitate the analysis. . 
4 For ease of exposition, the fast and slow tracks m figure l 
have the same career wage. Note, however, that any si ngle 
individual cannot move fo rward or backward with the same 
resulting career wage. The analysis in the next section will 
indicate which individuals can improve their career wage by 
moving for.vard and which individuals benefit fro m movi ng 
backward across cohorts. 
Acc um ulated 
Earn ings 
FIGURE 1. - DIHER.ENT! Al. TR.·\CK I NG 
stow t ra ck / 
{Cos< C)/ 
ss/ 
/ 
/ 
/ I 
I 
/ 
I 
I 
I 
no r mal t r oc '.: /j 
{Ca se Al ;· 
/ 
I 
I 
1 
T ' 1 
jl 
I 
I 
fa s t track 
{Case 81 
Time 
T 
of schooling. They then find career jobs at a wage 
determined by the initial cohort size. Individuals 
taking the fast track (case B) also spend T1 in the 
first stage. However, these individuals obtain more 
than average schooling and so incur added costs 
associated with school enrollment during the first 
stage. In stage two, they are able to compete with 
earlier and smaller cohorts in order to earn a 
higher career wage. Individuals taking the slow 
track (case C) delay entering the career labor 
market until T{ and incur a cost which depends 
upon the differential between the career wage and 
the entry wage. They can then compete with a 
smaller cohort in stage two and earn a higher 
career wage. 
The choices available to the individual are thus 
to move to an earlier career cohort through inten-
sive schooling, to move to a later cohort via less or 
more leisurely schooling, or to stay in the same 
birth cohort. 
Given that the career wage is assumed to be 
inversely related to cohort size, it can be shown 
that individuals will move away from the peak 
cohort by obtaining more schooling in the pre-peak 
region and by delaying career entry in the post-
peak region. In particular, individuals move ahead 
in terms of their career cohort so that the marginal 
benefit or higher wage received from an additional 
unit of schooling equals the marginal cost of ob-
taining that unit in terms of forgo ne earnings on 
entry jobs and the marginal cos t of education. 
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Whereas the margi nal cost of moving ahead is a 
function of the cost of schooling and the resulting 
forgone youth wage, for an individual moving 
backward , the marginal cost of moving is a func-
tion of the adult- youth wage differenti al for the 
extra time spen t in youth jobs. The abi lity of 
individu als to move to a desired career cohort is 
limited by increasing marginal costs of swi tching 
cohorts. A rigorous development of this model can 
be found in Wachter and Wascher (1984). 
The tracking effect depends in part on the ex-
istence of vintage effects in human capital; that is, 
ra ther than havi ng a single career labor market 
across age groups, age groups are imperfectly sub-
stitutable for each other. In this case, the earnings 
of older adults are partially shielded from the 
degree of overcrowding in the entering cohort. 
Each new group has its own age- earnings profile 
that only partially reflects excess demand condi-
tions before or af ter the career group. 5 
To the extent that specific training is pervasive, 
vintage effects should be important. If there is 
learning-by-doing, each year's new job entrants 
will be differentiated and, hence, partially in-
sulated from those coming before and after. Em-
ployers who use either formal or informal tenure 
procedures are validating vintage effects. Most 
professional and administrative markets function 
in this way, from universities with formal tenure 
rules to law firms with virtually formal tenure rules 
to management positions with a policy of "up or 
out." Seniority systems for blue collar workers also 
create formal vintage effects. These employment 
policies suggest that vintage effects are widespread 
and, thus, that timing one's entry into the tenure 
or vintage system can be used to alter one's life-
time earnings stream. 
III. Empirical Results 
We estimate a model in which individuals are 
assumed to base school enrollment decisions, 
5 Absent this effect, there would be only one age-earnings 
profile for all career workers. The profile need not be ft a t in 
that seniority wage increases could be institutionalized. Excess 
demand conditions, however, would be uniform for all career 
workers, so that an oversized, entry career group would not 
experience a disproportionate wage effect compared wi th older 
career workers. 
Empirical tes ting of human capital vintage effects is scanty 
due to data limitations. Welch (1979), for example, found that 
vintage effects existed but were strongest in the early career 
years and tended to dissipate with age. Freeman (1980) and 
Berger (1 981), however, found last ing vintage effects. 
ceteris paribus, on the rela tive sizes of the cohorts 
preceding and following them. This is measured by 
the ra tios of the population approximately ten 
years ahead or behind to the own cohort popula-
tion. RS1 and RS0 are the relative sizes of the 
younger and older cohorts, respect ively .6 The hy-
potheses have been tes ted using an annual time 
series of school enrollment fro m 1948 to 1980. Six 
demographic groups are represented: three age 
groups-16 to 17, 18 to 19, and 20 to 24 ; and each 
age group for males and females. 7 
Since our purpose is to tes t our demographic 
hypo thesis, we have adopted the basic time series 
schooling equation format generally used by 
o thers. 8 In addition to the leading (RS,. ) and lag-
ging (RS0 ) cohort barriers, we have inCluded real 
income (Y), military (MIL and DRAFT in the 
male equations) and marriage (MA R in the female 
equations) variables. A measure of labor market 
tightness proved to be sta tistically insignifican t 
and has been omitted from the fin al results. 9 
Following the specification adopted by Mattila 
(1982), two variables are used to capture sep-
arately military enlistment and draft effects on 
school enrollment. The argument is that although 
draft pressure encourages higher school enrollment 
ra tes, the rate of enlistment itself will decrease 
enrollment rates by taking some males who would 
have enrolled in school otherwise. Draft pressure 
is measured as the percentage of males inducted 
into the armed forces between 1960 and 1972, and 
the enlistment variable is simply the percentage of 
males in each age cohort in the armed forces . 
The results in table 1 impose the restriction that 
individuals respond equally to changes in the size 
of leading and lagging cohorts; that is , the coeffi-
cients on RSY and RSo are equal in absolute 
values. (The ratio of RS
0
/ RSY is denoted by RS.) 
In table 2, RSY and RS0 are entered separately. 
6 The demographic and school enrollment variables are in 
logari thmic form. Construction of all variables is presented in 
the appendix. 
7 Due to data limitations, the sample period for the 16 to 17 
a~e groups is 1953 to 1980. 
See, for example, Wachter and Kim (1982); Ahlburg, 
Crimmins, and Easterlin (1981); and Mattila (1982). 
9 The specific variable used was the aggregate unemployment 
rate divided by a demographically adjusted measure of the 
equilibrium unemployment rate U* The coefficients on the 
UGA P = U I U* variable were not significant for any of 
the age-sex groups when included in equations similar to those 
in tables 1 and 2. We have omit ted UGA P from the tables in 
the text due to probable rnulticollineari ty between UGA P, Y, 
and the trend variable . 
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TABLE I. -SCHOOL ENROLL/.1ENT EQUATI ONS: EQUA L E ITECTS FOR LE ADING AND 
LAGG ING BA RRIE RS 
Males Females 
16-17 16- 17 
c - 0.322 -0.419 
(- 5.83) (- 8.95) 
RS -0.247 - 0.250 
(- 5.29) (- 6.90) 
y 0.028 0.042 
(4 72) (91 4) 
i'vf 1 L -0.039 
(-371) 
MAR - 0.020 
( - 4 34) 
DRAFT 0.0004 
(0.93) 
R" 0.916 0.928 
D.W. 1.57 1.68 
Males 
18-19 
- 1.1 81 
( - 8 33) 
- 0.676 
( - 6 65) 
0.055 
(4.00) 
-0.01 5 
( - 3 24) 
0.005 
(3.98) 
0.935 
206 
Females 
18- 19 
- 1.414 
( - 4 99) 
- 0.421 
( - 4.02) 
0. 105 
(5.31) 
- 0.016 
( -- 2.52) 
0.938 
225 
Males 
20-24 
- 2.252 
(- 20.62) 
- 0.734 
(-445) 
0.085 
(5 .78) 
- 0.006 
( - 2 52) 
0.0007 
(0.3 1) 
0.93 9 
1.82 
No te: l. The depend ent variable is the log of the school enrollmen t rate for each Jgc-scx group . 
2. Indepe ndent vari ables: 
C = constant. 
Females 
20-24 
- 2.588 
(- 3 06) 
-0.663 
(- 2 51) 
0.220 
(4 70) 
-0.018 
(- 2 01) 
0.959 
1.90 
RS = log of the rati o of kading to lagging demographic harriers. Sec the appendix, poi nts 2 and J. 
Y = real income . 
MIL = mi li tary enlis tment rate for mak s in each age group. 
A1.4 R = marri age rate for fe males in each age group . 
DRAFT~ milit ary draft fo r males . 
1. !-statist ics are in paren theses. 
4. The data are annual observa tions from 1948 to 1980 for the 18 to 19 and 20 to 24 age groups. a nd from 1953 to 
1980 fo r the 16 to 17 age groups. 
5. The equations for the 20 to 24 year old groups were estimated using a maximum likelihood iterative technique to 
co rrec t for possible serial correlation. 
6. The estima ted values o f p were 0.312 for males and 0.287 fo r females. 
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The results of table 1 show that the differential 
tracking system is highly significant for all of the 
six age-sex groups with the correct negative sign 
on the RS variable. Those individuals born prior 
to a peak fertility rate year have a larger group of 
competitors following them than ahead (that is, 
RS is low) and thus have high school enrollment 
rates. Those individuals with a larger number of 
competitors ahead of them have lower school en-
rollment rates. 
who would have otherwise been enrolled in school. 
A marriage rate variable is included in the female 
equations. That variable is negative and significant 
for every age group. 
Efforts to include both a time trend and the real 
income variable in the model were unsuccessful 
due to the high collinearity between them. How-
ever, the real income variable, when included alone, 
is always significant, presumably capturing the 
long-run positive income elasticity that is generally 
found for school enrollment. 
The draft pressure variable is significant and 
positive for the age group most likely to be drafted, 
namely, the 18 to 19 year old male group. The 
enlistment rate variable is nega tive and significant 
for every male age group, capturing those males 
In table 2, we allow for unequal attention to 
leading and lagging cohorts by including RSY and 
RS
0 
as distinct variables. All of the leading bar-
riers, RS
0
, appear with the expected negative sign 
and all of the lagging barriers, RS,, with the 
expected positive sign. Ten of the twelve coeffi-
cients are significant with t-values greater than 2. 
Hence, these results are highly supportive of the 
asymmetric or differential tracking model. Tests 
for the equality in absolute value of the coefficients 
on the leading and lagging barriers did not reject 
the null hypothesis that changes in the size of 
leading and lagging cohorts yield equal changes in 
the school enrollment decisions of individuals. 
As mentioned above, our demographic variable 
measures a different phenomenon from that cap-
tured by the tradi tiona! cohort size variable. 
Specifically, the own cohort's size variable is equal 
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TABLE 2.-SCHOOL ENROLLMENT: WEIGHTED UNEQUAL EFfECTS FOR LEADING 
AND LAGGING BARRIERS 
Males Females Males Females Males Females 
16-17 16-17 18 - 19 18- 19 20-24 20-24 
c -0.306 -0.407 - 1.231 -1.312 -2.272 - 1.653 
( -4.83) ( -7 04) ( -7.78) ( -4 39) (-1326) (- 1 74) 
RS, 0.213 0.232 () 773 0.280 0.718 1148 
(2 65) (3 69) (4 62) (1.64) (3.62) (3 09) 
RSO -0.261 -0.263 - 0.55·~ -0.564 -0.774 -0.283 
( -4 80) (- 512) ( -2.84) ( - 3 26) (2 67) (- 0 94) 
y 0028 0.042 0.054 0.101 0.084 0.214 
(460) (8.59) (3.88) (5 03) (4.60) (5 14) 
i'v!J L -0.036 ·- 0.017 -0.006 
(- 2.84) (- 3 07) (- 238) 
1'v!AR -0 019 - 0 014 -0.025 
( -· 3 58) (- 2 28) ( -· 2 73) 
DRAFT 0.0005 0.005 0.0006 
(1.04) (3 82) (0.25) 
R2 0 917 0.929 0.937 0.940 0.938 0.968 
D.W. 1.61 l.6R 2.11 2.20 1.81 1.88 
Note: See the key to tab\c 1 Note the following exceptions: 
RSf. = the log of the ratio of the size of the neighboring younger cohort to the size of the own cohort. 
RS
0 
= the log of the ratio of the size of the neighhoring older cohort to the size of the own cohort. 
The estimated values of p in the 20 to 24 age group equations \vere 0.316 for males cmd 0.163 for females. 
to the percentage of the total population that is in 
a particular cohort. It is a measure of the height of 
the population density function. The demographic 
variables constructed here (RS,. and RS
0 
or RS), 
however, can be viewed as an approximation to 
the slope of the density function at a particular 
cohort point. 
A statistical test of the asymmetric demographic 
effect (measured by RS) against the traditional 
cohort size model (measured by the percentage of 
the population in a given cohort, denoted by RP) 
supports the former. Specifically, the F-statistics 
for the test of the model without RS versus the 
unconstrained version (table 3, column 2) are al-
ways significant, while the F-statistics for the test 
of the model without the traditional cohort size 
variable versus the unconstrained model (table 3, 
column 1) are not significant in any group. 10 
An alternative structural approach would view 
enrollment rates as being determined by the rate 
10 We also note that in the unconstrained model containing 
both our demographic variable, RS, and the RP construct. RS 
remained significant with the expected negative sign in all 
cases. However, the variable that measures the own cohort's 
size entered significantly in only two of the six equations 
(icmaks 16 to 17, 20 to 24), and then only one had the 
anticipated sign. 
of return to schooling, which is in turn a function 
of demographic variables. Our model, however, is 
a reduced form equation with exogenous variables 
on the right-hand side. The problem with imple-
menting the structural approach is that our model 
indicates that observed rates of return are likely to 
be biased measures of the expected rates. Specifi-
cally, the observed rate of return only reflects 
cohort size pressure of older groups and neces-
sarily excludes the impact of lagging cohort sizes 
on expected rates of return. Consequently, expec-
tations based only on leading cohort sizes are 
biased. 
We did, however, test our model against the 
alternative specification which included observable 
rates of return on education as independent vari-
ables. The specific rate of return variable that we 
used was constructed by Mattila (1982). In models 
which contained both the rate of return to educa-
tion and our demographic variables, the rate of 
return effect was not statistically significant. 
That individuals use lagging as well as leading 
cohort size indicators in their decision process 
means that they attempt to use all of the informa-
tion currently available. There is some support in 
the literature that individuals are aware of demo-
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TABLE 3. - TESTS O F ALTERNATIVE DEM OGRAP HI C SPEC ifiCAT IONS 
Unconstrained Mod el 
versus 
Ditkrent ial Tracking Model 
Unconstrained Mc>Jc l 
versus 
Own Cohort Size M e>dcl 
Males 16-17 
Females 16-17 
Males 18- 19 
Females 18-1 9 
Males 20- 24 
Females 20-24 
F-Stati s tic" 
0.09 
0.66 
236 
1 07 
0.006 
3.66 
F-Sta tistic " 
18.36h 
24 n n 
l7.07h 
l 7.14 h 
1135° 
5 63h 
Note: T he Differe nti al Tracki ng model is the llh)(k l p resented in tab le 1 The 0\v n Co hort Size model i:-- :1n 
~qu .1tion id e ntica l to th at o f tahk l. hut with the pcrcenta gt: of the p opu l.J.tion in the own cohort ( H.P) in piJ Cl' (• f 
RS. T he unconst rJ.. incd modd includ es hoth I? P and RS as expla na to ry vari ahles. 
3 A sign ilicant F-s uu is tic mean s that the null h ypot hc~is ( Di tkn.:: ntia l Track ing o r Qv.,·n Cohort Size) can b L" rcjL'L'tcd 
in favor of the un Cl)ns train ed nH•d el 
hSi g.n itlcan t at the 0.05 level. 
graphic considerations. The foreword to Russell 
(1982) states that , "Probably no one born during 
the baby boom that extended from just after World 
War II to the early 1960s is unaware of belonging 
to a special generation." 
Given current discussions over whether school 
enrollment rates have stopped or even reversed 
their historical upward swing, it is useful to de-
compose the enrollment equations to isolate the 
contribution of the differential tracking model. 
This decomposition is performed by comparing 
the fitted values of school enrollment rates using 
the coefficients in table 1 with the fitted values 
computed at the means of the demographic varia-
bles. 
The contribution of the differential tracking 
model to school enrollment rate trends is shown in 
table 4.ll The results indicate that teenagers born 
prior to the peak fertility years increased their 
school enrollment rates during the 1960s ap-
proximately 2.5% above the benchmark level pre-
dicted by real income, military, and marriage rate 
considerations. Those who were 20 to 24 years of 
age during the 1960s exhibited a 2% increase in 
school enrollment rates above the benchmark. 
II To isolate the demographic contribution to school enroll-
ment rates, we first compute values for school enrollment rates 
a t the mean of the demographic barrier variable. The contribu-
tion o f the differential tracking efl"ect can then be calculated as 
the fitted school enrollment rates minus the trend school enroll-
ment rates. Because we need to use a benchmark value of RS 
(in thi s case, the mean) in the computation of the trend, the 
particular level of the series for the contribution o f the demo-
graphic variables is con ditioned on the value of the benchm ark. 
That is, we cannot uniquely define, for example, a neutral o r 
zero demograph ic effec t. Since table 4 refers to th e contribution 
of the demographic effect over the benchm o. rk , we concentrate 
o n the swi ng in school enrollmen t rates over the 1960s a nd 
1970s. 
By the late 1970s, demographic considerations 
had reversed. Although youth cohorts were still 
large, they were now composed of individuals born 
after the peak rather than before the peak fertility 
years. The shift from the fast to the slow track 
meant a swing of between 3 and 7 percentage 
points for school enrollment rates. Teenage enroll-
ment rates were approximately 4 percentage points 
below our benchmark, while 20 to 24 year olds 
reduced their rates by less than 1 percentage point. 
The results of this model indicate that the un-
usual swings in school enrollment rates over the 
past two decades have been an endogenous re-
sponse to the unusually large swings in the popula-
tion profile. The trend rate of increase in school 
enrollment rates seems to be intact, but the inter-
mediate-run demographic cycle has caused large 
deviations from that trend. In this sense, school 
enrollment rates were "too high" in the 1960s and 
were then "too low" in the 1970s. 
IV. Conclusion 
In this paper we advance the hypothesis that 
individuals respond to cohort overcrowding differ-
ently depending upon whether they lead or trail 
the peak fertility year cohort. To maximize lifetime 
discounted earnings, individuals act so as to fill in 
the peaks and troughs of the demographic cycles 
exhibited by population and, hence, relative in-
come. 
The heuristic explanation for this phenomenon 
is the following: Baby boom individuals born be-
fore the peak in the fertility rate increase their 
human capital accumulation as a way of escapi ng 
from the huge cohort behind them. Education, 
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TA BLE 4. -CONTIUBUTION Of THE DIFFERE NTI AL TRAC KI NG EFFECT TO C!-1.\:-/GES 
IN SC HOO L [ N ROLU!E NT RATES 
(PERCENTAGE POINTS) 
Mal es Females 
16- 17 16- 17 
1960- 1969 2.63 2.56 
1970- 1975 - 0.77 -0.77 
1 '176 - 19l>O - 4.30 - 4.29 
wheth er general or specific, can be viewed as a 
"fast track., , By buying the ticket (the cost of 
additional trainin g) and entering the fast track, the 
early a rrival s can put greater distance between 
themselves and the peak group. Those born after 
the peak fertilit y year, however, face a different 
problem. With the bulk of the cohort ahead of 
them, there is no pressure to buy the ticket. The 
fast track only leads to an entry spot in the already 
oversized peak group. Hence, if anything, this 
group has the incentive of paying for the least 
amount of education. This allows them to use the 
least costly slow track and , hence, to draw closer 
to the undersized baby bust cohort. 
Education thus provides a differential tracking 
mechanism . While individuals cannot choose the 
cohorts in which they are born , they are able to 
time their entry into the career labor market 
through education. Those who want to speed ahead 
in order to compete with earlier cohorts engage in 
intensive education during their youth. Those who 
want to slow down in order to compete with later 
cohorts extend their noncareer job period and take 
a more leisurely approach to education. 
Thi s asymmetric demographic effect dominates 
the more traditional cohort size hypothesis. 
According. to the latter view, it is the size of the 
cohort rather than one's position relative to the 
peak and trough that counts. Those born five years 
before the peak birth rate are predicted to behave 
in a similar fashion to those born approximately 
five years after the peak. Although empirical re-
sults based on this model suggest that large cohorts 
tend to have large school enrollment rates , the 
issue is empirical since the theory itself does not 
yield a predicted sign. 
The asymmetric or differential tracking sys tem 
indicates that position in the cycle rather than the 
size of one's initial cohort dominates certain types 
of decisions such as schooling. This effect helps to 
explain the surp ri singly steep decline in school 
enrollment rates during the 1970s (in relation to 
Males Females Males Females 
18 - 19 18-19 20-24 20 - 24 
4.26 2 03 2.76 1.36 
0.3 7 0 18 2.22 142 
- 4. 14 - 2.52 - 0.50 - 0.42 
past trend rates of growth) as well as the very high 
enrollment rates observed during the 1960s. Essen-
tiall y, our empirical results indica te that a ttempts 
to escape the peak in cohort overcrowding resulted 
in a negative swing in school enrollment rates of 3 
to 7 percentage points between the 1960s and 
1970s. 
If it is positio n rather than cohort size that 
ma tters, then the tendency to move away from 
peak-sized cohor ts toward tro ugh-sized cohorts 
should continue to contribute negatively to en-
rollment rates fo r several more years. Cohorts 
entering their youth period will be smaller than 
preceding cohorts, but more importantly, they will 
be post-peak cohorts. Thereafter the effect should 
turn positive. 
A lthough we have applied the asymmetric de-
mographic model only to school enrollment rates, 
it may also affect other labor supply and invest-
ment decisions. We view our model and results as 
tentati ve but perhaps suggestive of these more 
general applications to the study of demographic 
and economic relationships. 
DATA APPENDIX 
Definition and Construction of Variables 
l. School Enrollment Rates are the percentage of the total 
noninstitutional population in each age- sex group enrolled 
in school. 
Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-20, School 
Enrollmen t, Current Population Reports, various is-
sues. 
2. The Relative Younger Cohort variable ( RS,) is the ratio of 
the size of the neighboring younger cohort to the own cohort 
SIZe. 
For the 16 to 17 groups: 
POP 6-15/POP 16- 17 
For the 18 to 19 groups: 
POP 8-17/ POP 18-19 
For the 20 to 24 groups: 
POP 10-19/ POP 20- 24. 
j 
1 
i 
~ 
i 
l 
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The \\·cighting sche me gives a weight of 1.0 to the closest 
neighboring ,i nglc age groups Jnd dccrcJses the weight by 
l j n for every addi tionJ I year, n, a group is from the cohort 
o f in te rest. l'or C.\amp lc. fo r the 16 to 17 groups. the 
ne igh boring lagging cohort is defmcd JS 
0.1 · POP(6) + O.ll POP( 7) + 0.125 · POP( 'ii ) + 
t-0.5 · POP(14) + 1.0 · PO P (lS) 
The \\ Cights on these arc Jrbit rary and a rc meant to cap ture 
the declini ng vin tage crrect:i. Changing the weights had littk 
dTcct on the re,;ul ts . 
Population in anv Jge- sex group is the to tal nonins tituti,,nal 
population for a given year. 
Sou rce· US Depa rtment of LJbo r. BureJu of Labor Stat is-
tics. Bull etin 2096, Labor Force Stalistics DeriL'ed 
from 1he CwH:nt Populalion Suruer: A Duwhook 
(Sep t. 19[)2) 
3. The Relative Older Cohort variable ( RS") is the rJtin of the 
size o f the neigh boring older cohor t to the size o f the own 
cohort. 
Fo r the 16 to 17 groups: 
POP 18- 27/POP 16-17 
For the 18 to 19 groups: 
POP 20- 29/PO P 18-19 
For the 20 to 24 groups: 
POP 25 - 34/ POP 20-24 . 
The weigh ts are similar to those above. 
4. The Sym metric Demographic variable is the rela tive size of 
the older cohort to the younger cohort. The breakdown is 
simi lar to that used above. 
5. The Own Cohort 's Size variable is measured as the popula-
tion in a given cohort re la tive to the to tal population. 
6. Real Income is median annual income for males 45 to 54 
years of age in thousands of 1967 doll ars . 
Source: U .S. Bureau of the Census, Series P-60. Consumer 
In come, Current Population Reports, various issues. 
7. The Draft variable = 0 for 1948 to 1959 and for 1973 to 
1980 
= (inductees per 1,000 males 16 + ) 
1960 to 1972. 
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